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COLLEGIALITY AMONG ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES
- AS WELL AS INDEPENDENCE - WOULD BE LOST
IF JUDGES ARE EVALUATED BY CHIEF JUDGES ON
POLICY CORRECTNESS
Richard L. Sippel
An Observation
There is less pressure exerted on judges than one would think.
There simply is no need for it. To adjudicate these cases, proven judges
are chosen who will always conduct the trial in the desired direction
and pronounce the needed sentence. WASHINGTON POST For The
Record, December 5, 1986, Verbatim Interview With An East European
Judge.
Introduction
In 1991, the former Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS)I was requested by the Office Of Personnel Management
(OPM) to conduct a study of the "landscape" of federal administrative
adjudication.2 The governmental study and a related survey were
swiftly funded, conducted and completed. In May and August 1992,
ACUS published two draft documents entitled The Federal
Administrative Judiciary (referred to in this article as the Study).' The
*The writer is a federal administrative law judge at the Federal Communications
Commission. The views herein are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of others.
'Washington Post, Metro Section, November 1, 1995 (ACUS was "zero funded by
a Congress out to eliminate waste and red tape"). Compare the American Bar Association's
ABA 21 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, (Winter 1996, No. 2) (House-Senate conference committee
voted to terminate ACUS funding, a "penny-wise, pound-foolish decision"). From 1968 to
1995, ACUS issued approximately 200 recommendations, most of which were at least partially
implemented. Id
2The Study, The Federal Administrative Judiciary reported that there were
approximately 1,185 federal administrative law judges. Study at Appendix 1. See Joseph J.
Simeone, The Function, Flexibility, And Future of United States Judges Qf The Executive
Department, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 165 (1992) (breakdown of judges by agency and pay
grade).
3OPM had asked that the Study survey agency and practitioners attitudes toward
administrative law judges but only data of responding judges were reported. See Study at 1.
Probably the weakest link in the Study is the absence of data on the users of APA adjudication,
the parties and the practitioners.
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Study was the subject of a plenary meeting of ACUS in September
1992. Final approval was given at a subsequent meeting in December
1992. See Recommendation 92-7 adopted by ACUS on December 10,
1992, 57 FEDERAL REGISTER, 61759 (December 29, 1992). The Study
was published in its entirety in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS,
ACUS 779 (Vol. II) (1992).
Subsequent articles have commented on, criticized and defended
the substance and recommendations of the Study." The narrow focus of
this article examines the adverse effects on administrative adjudication
of the Study's recommendation for chief administrative law judges
(chief judges) to evaluate administrative law judges on fidelity to
agency/department policy in rulings and decisions issued under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Study found that "ALJs do
not often seek to effect changes in agency policy." Study at 924.
Therefore, there has not been a statistical case made for evaluations on
adherence to policy. And, as explicated below, to adopt such a system
would create an unneeded tension between chief judges and
administrative law judges.' Even worse, it appears that the ACUS
recommendation may have been an attempt to gain executive control
over administrative law judge adjudication which would violate both
the letter and the spirit of the APA.
4James P. Timony, Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges,
7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U 629, 647-653 (1994). See also, Charles P. Rippey, Undermining the
Administrative Procedure Act: How ACUS Threatens the Independence and Merit Selection
of Federal administrative Law Judges, JUDGES' JOURNAL (Spring 1993); Brian C. Griffin and
Gary J. Edles, An Alternative Look at the Administrative Conference's Recommendations on
the Administrative Judiciary and Judge Rippey's Reply, JUDGES' JOURNAL (Fall 1993); Ronnie
A. Yoder, A Critique of the ACUS Report on the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39
FEDERAL BAR NEWS & J., No.7; Habermann, et al., A Synopsis of the ACUS Report on the
Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 FEDERAL BAR NEWS & J., No.7; Edward T. Miller, FBA
Critiques ACUS Draft Report on the Federal Administrative Judiciary, THE FEDERAL JURIST
(Winter 1992).
'It also seriously threatens adjudicatory independence:
The existence of such performance appraisals severely undercuts any
procedural protections normally conferred in administrative
hearings. [footnote omitted]
Timony, supra at 646.
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ACUS Evaluations On Policy Correctness
The recommendation of ACUS on evaluations for
administrative law judges prescribed the following:
Chief ALJs should be given the authority to:
Conduct regular ALJ performance review based on
relevant facts, including case processing guidelines,
judicial comportment and demeanor, and the existence,
if any of a clear disregard of a pattern of nonadherence
to properly articulated and disseminated rules,
procedures, precedents, and other agency policy.6
To assure that evaluations were done, OPM would be empowered to
conduct "regular performance review of Chief ALJs." This article will
argue the position that aside from the threat to adjudicative
independence and the unfairness of off-the-record evaluations of
persons who adjudicate cases, ACUS-type evaluations would create
debilitating tensions resulting in compromise of collegiality and would
raise serious questions of judicial ethics. This article also is a critique
of the ACUS recommendation for evaluations by chief judges of other
administrative law judges on the correctness of policy rulings and the
subsequent evaluation by OPM of the chief judges on how well they
make such evaluations.8
A "Looking Glass" Proposal For Prohibited Evaluations
In administrative adjudication, policies in general should be
determinable from statutes, legislative histories, governmental rules,
'Recommendations and Statements of the Administrative Conference of the United
States Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 57 FED. REG. 61759, 61764
(December 29, 1992).
'Idat 61764 supra n. 4 at 646.
'There is no discussion here on recommendations for procedures for the discipline
or removal of administrative law judges. It is noted, however, that in disciplinary proceedings,
there must be a hearing before an administrative law judge at the Merit System Protection
Board and a finding of good cause. 5 U.S.C. §7521. For a critique on present procedures for
discipline and removal, see Delbert R Terill, Jr., Complaint Procedures Institute By And
Against Federal Administrative Law Judges Need Reform Now, JUDGES' JOuRNAL 27 (Fall
1994).
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regulations, agency/departmental decisions and interpretative public
releases. The Study concludes that agency regulations are the "primary
source" of policy direction for administrative law judges. Study at 919.
A resounding ninety six percent of the judges surveyed acknowledged
that regulations are "very important" to their decision. Id. Therefore,
there does not appear to be a need for evaluation of adjudicatory policy
adherence. Admittedly, there are times when a policy may be evolving
and therefore difficult for a judge to apply in a fast moving administra-
tive adjudication. The difficulty will vary depending on the policy
which may be substantive or procedural or which may be developing
rather than established. In federal administrative adjudication, cases are
litigated under the APA and parties and their counsel generally rely on
precedent applied under principles that are akin to stare decisis. See
Study at 993, 1005 (agencies can to an extent control policy and
maintain decisional consistency by a system of precedents as used by
the courts). Where changes in policy are taking place and precedent
would not apply,9 the parties should be able to affect the outcome
through evidence, briefs and arguments which shape the case from its
inception through appeals. And that is how policy questions in
litigation should be decided in a true democracy. In a recent study of
federal administrative law chiefjudges, a law professor concluded that
in the tradition of adjudication in the United States, if an agency or
department does not like an administrative law judge's decisions, it can
"simply reverse them."'°
By contrast, the methodology of evaluation devised by ACUS
has elements of the classic, "Alice In Wonderland." The Study sought
to give chief judges cover by shielding them from direct agency
9An agency has the right to develop new policies provided that it gives a principled
explanation for its change of direction. Nat'l Black Media Coalition v. F.C.C., 775 F.2d 342,
355 (D.C. Cir. 1985). But an agency may not repudiate precedent simply to conform with a
shifting political mood. Id. at 356 n.17, citing Int'l Ladies' Garments Workers v. Donovan, 722
F.2d 795, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983). These are rules of interpretation applied by Article III courts
in their quests to decipher the current meaning of an agency's or department's latest policy.
These rules of interpretation illustrate how complex it can be and illustrate the risky business
of evaluating judges for their correctness of policy interpretation and application.
"°Russell L. Weaver, Management Of AL Offices In Executive Departments And
Agencies, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 303-336 (1995) (an ACUS funded study of chief administrative
law judges in the federal system which does not recommend an evaluation of administrative
law judges by chiefjudges).
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appraisals while subjecting them to OPM evaluation or review by OPM
of their appointments and renewals. The agency that employs the chief
judge would not directly evaluate the chiefjudge on policy correctness.
Rather, officials at OPM would conduct the chiefludge's evaluation and
then report back to the agency on whether the chief judge had properly
determined the agency's policy in the chief judge's evaluations of
administrative law judges. In that way (so the Study concludes) the
chief judge remains independent of the agency. Study at 1031. But
there is no mention of how the evaluators at OPM become sufficiently
learned in the policies of over thirty agencies to correctly interpret the
various policies. The logical solution would be for the OPM officials
to go back to the agency for an interpretation and that would indirectly
permit the agency to evaluate the chiefjudge on the sly 1 in violation of
the APA.'2
The Study would even have the APA amended to authorize
(require) chief judges to "bring the charges against wayward judges."
Study at 1025. The Study also would authorize chief judges to
recommend "performance-based bonuses" of the kind that are available
to members of the Senior Executive Service. Study at 1024 That stick
and carrot technique would decimate the philosophy of true
adjudicative independence that has been embedded in the APA since
1946.
APA Adjudication At Risk
Since its inception fifty years ago, the APA has prohibited
performance appraisals of administrative lawjudges. 5 U.S.C. §5372.
And since the enactment of the APA, Congress has twice considered
and twice rejected mandatory evaluations of administrative law
judges. 3  In an extreme deviation from the APA's guarantee of
independence and the related prohibition ofjudicial evaluations, ACUS
"Like the queen and king in Alice's Wonderland, the agencies acting under ACUS'
recommendation could operate contrary to principles of due process and judicial independence:
"'You never had fits, my dear, I think?' the King said to the Queen. 'Never!' said the Queen,
furiously throwing an inkstand at the Lizard as she spoke. 'Then the words don't fit you,' said
the King, looking around the Court with a smile." Carroll, ALICE IN WONDERLAND (Oxford
Univ. Press, 1989) at 108.
2See Study, supra n.2 at 1025 and at 1031.
"Timony, supra n.4 at 632.
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expected to have chiefjudges evaluate administrative law judges on the
correctness of their applications of agency or departmental policy. To
enhance executive control over the evaluations, ACUS recommended
that chief judges serve for a term of only five years with the possibility
of renewal. In that way, favorable evaluations of chief judges by OPM
would become crucial to renewed appointments in that position. Thus,
the inescapable conclusion arises that "[T]he Chief ALJ will not want
to lose the title and extra pay of the position and will, therefore, be
subject to the will of the agency." "4
The commissioning of chief judges to review the policy
correctness of other judges' decisions would, if implemented, not only
destroy decisional independence, but also would adversely affect
collegiality while raising questions of judicial ethics. And in the final
analysis, it would become a failure in efficiency because it would
require an inordinate expenditure of time which could best be put to the
more productive alternative use of hearing and deciding cases.
Misperceptions Of The Work Of Administrative Law Judges
Inconclusive survey data of the Study "suggests" to its authors
that "ALJs are inclined to resolve individual controversy as best they
can and let the review stages of the adjudicative process resolve the
policy questions." Study at 921. That speculative conclusion was
reached without any analysis of how written decisions of administrative
law judges are viewed by the courts, a serious omission since reviewing
courts have assigned importance to the decisions of administrative law
judges in the appellate review of the agency records. 5
Notwithstanding the recognized reliability of administrative law judges'
"Timony, supra n.4 at 650.
"
5Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts On Beginnings And Ends: Court Of Appeals
Review OfAdministrative Law Judges'Findings And Opinions 67 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 661, 664
(1989). See also Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (positive recognition
by Supreme Court of the findings of administrative law judges); NLRB v. Permanent Label
Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527-28 (3rd Cir. 1981) (the high qualifications of administrative law
judges merit respect); and Pennzoil Co. v. F.E.R.C., 789 F.2d 1128, 1135 (5th Cir. 1986)
(credibility findings of ALJs are entitled to special weight and evidence supporting a
conclusion is likely to be less substantial when the ALJs conclusion differs from that of the
agency).
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decisions, the Study assumes that administrative law judges regularly
fail to apply, or fail to apply correctly, the relevant policy in cases that
they adjudicate. However, the primary fault is not ascribed to the
judges. The Study concludes that a substantial part of the "problem"
lies with the failures of agencies to articulate adequately their policies.
While acknowledging that inadequate policy articulation lies at the
heart of the problem, ACUS still would have chief judges review
administrative law judges for any "clear disregard of or pattern of
nonadherence to properly articulated and disseminated rules,
procedures, precedents, and other agency policy." Study
Recommendation, supra. The professional viability of chiefjudges and
administrative law judges would depend ultimately on a bureaucratic
evaluation of the correctness of policy interpretations which would be
performed indirectly by the agency or department whose policy is in
issue.
The Historically Accepted Method Of Review
The legal process of the United States empowers reviewing
authorities to reverse erroneous rulings of administrative law judges. 6
Also, there is a constant element of accountability in that the orders and
decisions of federal administrative law judges are published (at least
locally) and are subject to review within the agency or department
(5 U.S.C. §557). If the decision is affirmed or adopted by the agency,
it is ultimately appealable to an Article III court. 7 See Study at 1004
(an agency is authorized to review any initial or recommended decision
of a person who presides in an APA adjudication). Thus, the checks
and balances of the traditional review process, and the fact that peers,
'
6Usually, there is provision for a de nova review within an agency or department.
5 U.S.C. §557. Setting aside an agency decision is required when it is found by a federal
appellate court to not be supported by substantial evidence or to be arbitrary and capricious or
for an abuse of discretion or for otherwise not acting in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. §706.
See generally Gellhorn & Bayer, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS (2d Ed. 1981) at 56-62.
See also Steadman v. S.E.C., 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
In that sense, there is no "hidden judiciary" such as is the case with administrative
judges who are not selected through the merit selection system and whose independence is not
protected by the APA. Cf e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A
Focus On Our Invisible Judiciary, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 109 (1981). Thomas C. Mans, Selecting
The Hidden Judiciary, 63 JUDICATURE 60 (1979); Alice Klement, Hidden Judiciary Fights
Back NATL L.J., Sept., 24, 1979, at 18.
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the bar and the public see all, influences trial judges to try to get it right
in the first instance, i.e., to rule in accord with current policy. The
Study concluded based on selected literature that the current system is
not sufficient because the mere review of administrative law judges'
decisions, as provided for by the APA, "does not normally modify
behavior as effectively as the choice between conforming to a given
norm and suffering direct adverse consequences." Study at 1013."8
Thus, it is more behavior modification of administrative law judges
than correctness of policy interpretation which was the goal of the
ACUS model. Evaluations of the kind envisioned by ACUS that aim
to achieve uniform adherence to policy could be used systematically to
fashion non-independent judges. Certainly, any system of
administrative adjudication where adrministrative law judges may suffer
"direct consequences" beyond reversal or remand for being perceived
in an evaluation as failing to meet a "given norm" would mark a
substantial retreat from the independence of judges that is expected by
parties and their counsel under the APA. Over time, it could lead to
"proven judges" akin to those in totalitarian governments. Ultimately,
it would forever silence collegiality which has been a hallmark among
APA appointed administrative adjudicators since 1946.
An Impossible Standard To Apply Evenly
A natural tension would be created when a chiefjudge and other
judges in the same agency are applying the same policy at or about the
same time in litigated cases. Under the ACUS model, chief judges
would have an incentive to retain personal interpretations because they
would ultimately be evaluated by OPM on the correctness of their
evaluations of how other judges had applied the same policy. As a
"
8See L. Hope O'Keefe, Note, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluations
and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54
GEO.WASHL. REV. 591(1986) accorded great weight by the Study. See Study at 1011 n.1198
(this well researched Note was represented as being very helpful in preparing the Study's
analysis on performance evaluations for administrative law judges). The Note concluded that
freedom of administrative law judges from performance evaluations by their employing
agencies is an "integral aspect of that independence." 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. at 626-27. That
conclusion of O'Keefe would not qualify as support for the ACUS recommendation on
evaluations.
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result, the ACUS proposal presents a myriad of real-world questions for
which the Study provides no answers or guidance. For example, will
chief judges be permitted or required to compare the range of
interpretations among all judges addressing the same issue? How
would that affect case assignments? 9 Will an administrative law judge
who addresses a policy ab initio be at risk of a negative evaluation if his
or her initial analysis differs from the later analysis of the reviewing
chief judge regardless of the correctness of the ruling? The Study
answers in the afTirmative if there is shown to be a "clear disregard" or
a "pattern of nonadherence" to "properly articulated policy." Consider
the uncertainty that standard creates in the application of a new or
evolving policy, such as one involving prompt decisions, limited
discovery, or encouragement of settlements. In these as well as in other
areas, there may be a change affected or a nuance applied to an existing
regulation or policy through an administrative adjudication which
avoids the formal requirements of notice and comment. See
Homemakers North Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 412-13 (7th
Cir. 1987), citing Motor Vehicle Mfgrs v. State Farm, 103 S. Ct. 2856,
2866, 2874 (1983). The court in Bowen highlighted the predicament:
"a question is debatable when it could be decided in different ways by
reasonable people." The court then noted that there are 13 circuit courts
of appeals and more than 500 district judges. 832 F.2d at 412.
Certainly, different administrative law judges also should be allowed
to differ on a policy's application as reasonable people without being
subjected to negative performance evaluations.
An Elusive Standard For Evaluation
Agencies and departments can expect that administrative law
judges who are hearing assigned cases, whether employed directly by
Tlhe APA provides that cases shall be assigned to administrative law judges "in
rotation so far as practicable." 5 U.S.C. §3105. Professor Weaver found that most
administrative law judges "view chief judges as their colleagues and peers and trust them to
recognize the realities of the situation in assigning cases." Weaver, supra n. 10 at 322. That
trust would be lost under a regimen of ACUS evaluations.
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the agency or department or on loan for the purpose of the case,2" will
do their utmost to apply correctly policy changes that are evolving. Yet
under the ACUS proposal, there are situations where such devotion to
duty would place a judge in jeopardy of receiving a negative evaluation
by a chief judge. For example, it is a basic proposition of due process
that a judge may not go outside of the record in determining any
substantive, procedural or evidentiary issue because the right to a trial-
type hearing necessarily includes knowledge by the parties of the
factors considered by the judge.2 Assume that an agency found in the
course of deciding an interlocutory appeal that an administrative law
judge's reference to a proposed policy change or modification that was
then under consideration by the agency did not constitute an extra-
judicial source for which the judge could be disqualified. If the judge
were to be evaluated soon after the ruling wherein the policy was
interpreted prospectively, what standard does the chief judge apply on
whether the administrative law judge made the correct ruling? As the
policy gets closer to adoption, will the same standard apply for all
judges who are evaluated by the same chiefjudge even though the cases
are different? If the judge was found to be wrong, at what point can the
argument be asserted that the policy was prospective and therefore not
yet "properly articulated?" How can the evaluation standard be uniform
when there is no standard prescribed or suggested by ACUS for
situations where there will be different outcomes in different cases
based on different facts that are decided at different times in the course
of the policy's development?
Would the APA be amended to insure that there will be no ex
parte direction from a chief judge while a case is sub judice? Are
judges to be left to the fates in hoping to receive a reasoned evaluation?
2 As contemplated by the APA [5 U.S.C. §3344], there is a loan program under
which OPM details judges to hear cases at departments/agencies which have no need for a full
time administrative law judge (e.g., U.S. Customs Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms). In FY 1992, there were a total of 327 cases heard and decided by borrowed
judges. (Statistics prepared by OPM's Office of Administrative Law Judges). See Study at
966 (loan program and transfers of judges among agencies are ample testimony to the
capability ofjudges to handle a variety of cases). The Study did not address the evaluation by
chiefjudges or by anyone else of those judges who hear and decide cases on a loan assignment.
2
"Sedeellhom & Boyer, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, supra note 16 at 218.
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Will OPM be required by the Congress to issue "guidelines" for
evaluating administrative law judges on how they must apply agency
policy? These are substantial questions which the Study does not
address. The correct prediction of an expected outcome becomes even
more elusive should the judge who receives a negative evaluation later
turn out to have been correct after appeals are taken through the
agency/department or after court review. Yet at the time of evaluation,
the chief judge could conclude that the judge was in "clear disregard"
of a "properly articulated policy" even though a proposed change to the
policy was in its embryo stage and the rulings made were interlocutory
in fast-moving, trial-type hearings. The permutations of this
hypothetical can be applied beyond the above illustration. Such a
plethora of possible outcomes at different stages of a policy's
development makes clear the folly of having chief judges evaluate
administrative law judges on the correctness of their ad hoc
applications of policy.
An Inefficient System Of Adjudication
Moreover, there follows a resulting adjudicatory inefficiency by
way of a negative incentive. For if the ACUS Study was accurate in
finding that administrative law judges avoid making policy choices (a
conclusion rejected by this writer as speculative and misleading) thus
leaving the policy issue for higher authorities to sort out, (Study at 924-
925) administrative law judges would be encouraged to be even more
reluctant to rule on policy questions at hearings knowing that they will
be evaluated on policy correctness. This would be a logical outcome
even with a limitation on negative evaluations to situations where there
is found by a reviewing chief judge to be a "clear disregard" or a
"pattern of nonadherence" to "properly articulated policy."22 But when
is there a clear disregard? And would not a forthright chief judge
caution any judge who made a one-time error in policy (as such error
might be perceived by the reviewer) so that the judge will get it right
'Recommendations, supra at 57 FED. REG. 61759, 61764. A "pattern of
nonadherence" is difficult to establish and it becomes highly subjective to reach a "clear
disregard" and a "properly articulated policy" which are subjective standards that could be used
to reign in a judge who was perceived to be overly independent.
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the next time rather than wait for a "pattern of nonadherence" to
develop? If a chiefjudge should permit a pattern to develop, would not
the chief judge be susceptible to an unfavorable review at OPM?
Would it be unethical for a chief judge to allow a judge to lapse into a
pattern of nonadherence so that there would be a basis for an adverse
evaluation? Certainly, at a minimum, counsel appearing in cases where
judges are being evaluated on their policy rulings should be entitled to
know that the policy is ultimately being ascertained by the chief judge.
Should counsel also be entitled to discovery? What would be the scope
of permissible discovery? Might there not be situations where an
administrative law judge thinks it to be in her or his best interest to
"screen" in advance with the chief judge an application of a policy so
that the judge would be sure to "get it right" at hearing? Suppose there
is disagreement under that last scenario - can a chiefjudge "order" an
administrative law judge to follow the chiefjudge's interpretation or run
the risk of an adverse evaluation? Must a judge who receives such an
order in the midst of a hearing announce forthwith to counsel that the
law of the case on the policy issue has been set exjudice by the chief
judge and that therefore counsel's arguments submitted on the issue will
not be worth considering? That is no way to conduct adjudication.
Judicial Ethics At Risk
Canon 3.A(4) of the Model Code provides:
An administrative law judge should accord to all
persons who are legally interested in a proceeding, or
their lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and
except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider
ex parte or other communications as to substantive
matters concerning a pending or impending proceeding.
A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a
disinterested expert on the law applicable to a
proceeding if notice is given to the parties of the person
consulted and the substance of the advice, and the
parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond.
A related Commentary instructs that the proscription against
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communications does not preclude a judge from consulting with other
judges or with other subordinate personnel whose function is to assist
the judges in adjudicative matters. Id. That concession to the exparte
prohibition specifically conditions the discussion of issues with equals
or subordinates. Must there now be a prohibition of the acceptable
practice of discussing current cases with chiefjudges as colleagues who
through longevity and experience could be among the best resources for
a trial judge on a particular question of practice or procedure? An
experienced jurist has concluded that there is no violation of the
presumption of Model Code against ex parte contacts when a judge
confers with another judge "of the same level" on a pending issue.
C.T. Harhut, Ex Parte Communication Initiated By A Presiding Judge,
68 TEMP. L. REv. 673, at 681, 695 (1994). "[I]t is the public's
perception of impropriety and fairness that establishes the norm for
judicial conduct". Id. at 695.23 It seems evident that continuing
"collegial" contacts with chiefjudges who were formerly colleagues but
who now would be evaluating the judge initiating the exparte contact
would be perceived as at least improper if not outrageous.
Professor Weaver found that many administrative law judges
view chief judges as their peers, particularly where chief judges
continue to hear cases. Weaver, supra n.10 at 316. On the other hand,
informal ex parte discussions with superior officials, who would be
evaluating performances on the issues for which advice or comment is
sought, would contaminate the desired collegiality. Ultimately, it
would be necessary to amend the Model Code to prohibit such
informal exparte contacts should the ACUS recommendation ever be
adopted and incorporated into the APA, a deleterious result that raises
an ethical consideration neither recognized nor addressed by the ACUS
Study.
'Judge Harhut's article utilized statistical data which he obtained from survey
questions to fellow judges. He reported that "[a]n overwhelming majority of the judges
believed collegiality among judges should be encouraged." He also cites to proceedings of the
American Political Sciences Association where Judge Ginsberg, now Justice Ginsberg, stated
that "[]udges should share ideas and experiences" and emphasized that a "judge should be able
to talk with somebody about working out a particular problem." Mark I. Bemsetein, Expert
Testimony in Pennsylvania, 68 TEMP. L. REV. at 699, (1995). A debilitating relationship
between chief judges and judges would be directly counterproductive to Justice Ginsberg's
admonition to share information through collegiality.
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Reasonable And Ethical Alternatives Exist
A less extreme procedure for evaluating administrative law
judges was approved by the ABA's Board of Governors in 1979. The
ABA would assign the evaluations of administrative law judges to an
outside administrator who was not employed by the judge's agency or
department. The standards for the evaluations by such a disinterested
person would be developed and adopted by a panel composed by a
majority of administrative law judges. The proper application of an
agency's policy is not contemplated by the ABA as a standard for
evaluation. In stark contrast to the ACUS recommendation, under the
ABA's model a chief judge would not be the final arbiter of the
standards and a chief judge would have no role in the evaluations.
Federal legislation which was introduced in the 104th Congress,
but failed to pass (H.R. 1802 and its companion S. 486), would have
created a federal Corps of Administrative Law Judges. The Corps
would have a governing council comprised of chiefjudges representing
eight divisions based on regulatory specialties. The council would
function under a Chief Judge of the Corps who would be appointed by
the President of the United States. There would be a structured
program for the improvement ofjudicial performance pursuant to ABA
guidelines. In keeping with the ABA's 1979 policy, there would be no
direct participation of chief judges in evaluations. The ABA supports
the Corps legislation.24
Thus, there are suggested methods of performance evaluation
systems 25 which, if evenly and properly employed, should not conflict
24Statement ofJohn T. Miller, Jr. On Behalf of the American Bar Association Before
the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Committee of the Judiciary House
of Representatives In Support of HR 1802, Reorganization of the Federal Administrative
Judiciary Act, July 26, 1995. The Corps legislation would, inter alia, provide for the
improvement of administrative law judges' performance pursuant to the American Bar
Association's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Judicial Performance. But to make it work, the
chief judge of a Corps should be a "practical [person] who will administer the administrative
judicial process with understanding and common sense." Remarks of ChiefAdministrative Law
Judge, John W. Hardwicke, State of Maryland on Maryland's Experience with its
Administrative Law Judge Corps, July 1995. The federal Corps is not supported by all federal
administrative law judges. Some have concerns about the loss of agency/departmental
expertise. The federal Corps legislation is in for a rough ride.
"
5This preoccupation with evaluation is not universal. Government officials other
than administrative law judges are excluded by statute from evaluations at the Central
Intelligence Agency and the State Department. See Study at 1011 n.1 197. In ajudicial context,
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with APA independence. See Timony, supra n. 4 at 641-644.26 And if
there must be evaluations, there should be a system designed by a
committee of peers and lawyers who practice in the specialty. But
without a Corps, such a system would need to take into account the fact
that there are agencies with small numbers of judges. Therefore, the
committees of peers probably would need to involve all agencies which
leaves open the question of the expertise of the peers to evaluate a
policy. In another alternative which would involve less bureaucracy,
lawyers could simply be surveyed by questionnaires and, with certain
protections of confidentiality, the results could be transmitted to
individual administrative law judges for educational purposes. Most
importantly, none of these methods involve the destruction of
collegiality among chief judges and administrative law judges or
facially run afoul of the Model Code.
Conclusion
Recall that none of the relevant legislation since the adoption of
the APA in 1946, wherein lies the charter of administrative law judge
independence, provides for any system of evaluations of administrative
law judges. Evaluations by chief judges would no doubt be rejected.
The concept of chief judges preferring charges against and awarding
performance bonuses to administrative law judges would be dead on
arrival. Hopefully, the issue will not reappear in any future proposed
legislation. The evaluation process recommended by ACUS would cut
off meaningful dialogue among judges. And it would ignore the
recognition by the United States Supreme Court of the similarity of the
work of federal administrative law judges to the trial work of United
States district judges.27 Evaluations by chiefjudges would be to many
jurists the antithesis of collegial relationships among judges. The Chief
Justice of the United States allows that his fellow justices defer to him
on matters of law "not in the slightest."2 And the great jurist Learned
Hand viewed his role as Chief Judge of the Second Circuit as being first
the recommendation for U.S. District Court Judges is one of accountability for the status of
dockets, not evaluations. See Final Report of the Civil Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (August 1993).
26in an earlier ACUS sponsored article on evaluation, an authority on the subject
suggested a panel from "bench, bar, groups, and relevant sections of academia." Victor
Rosenblum, Evaluation Of Administrative Law Judges: Aspects of Purpose, Policy and
Feasibility (1983), cited by Judge Timony, supra n.5 at 630 n. 4.
"Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978).
282 A.B.A. J. 46 (October 1996).
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on matters of law "not in the slightest. ' 2' And the great jurist Learned
Hand viewed his role as Chief Judge of the Second Circuit as being first
"to decide cases" and, secondarily, to "foster harmonious collegial
relations through informal measures."'  There is no such historical or
current personage of similar high caliber to which the Study refers as
authority for a newly created role of chief judges as the appraisers,
indicters and rewarders of other administrative law judges.
The administrative law judge community should be mindful that
the ACUS Study was funded, researched, prepared and published as an
official governmental report of a federal agency. It was commenced
without any advance consultation of the chief judges or of the
administrative law judges who are the subject of the Study. Nor was the
practicing bar surveyed on how they compare independent
administrative law judges with agency adjudicators who do not have
APA independence. After cooperating in the survey, the federal
administrative law judge community found that its historical
independence had been placed in harms way and that chiefjudges were
being set up for term appointments with renewals dependent upon OPM
(and indirectly agency) approval of how well they evaluate other
judges. The timely article of Professor Weaver on the true role of chief
judges which was published on the heels of the Study communicated
the value of collegiality. And it makes no mention of the Study's
recommendation for evaluation.30  The historical context of
independence of administrative law judges under the APA as articulated
in Judge Timony's article demonstrates how extreme a deviation from
the norm would be ACUS' evaluation scheme. In view of such
authorities and in recognition of the inherent value of collegiality, the
ACUS recommendation for evaluations should not be seen again.3
2882 A.B.A. J. 46 (October 1996).
29Gerald Gunther, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994) at 514.
3 The Weaver article, which was commissioned by ACUS before the Study Draft
became public, appeared shortly after the ACUS Study, focused almost exclusively on the role
of chiefjudges, and was ultimately published as an ACUS funded work in August 1993. But
ACUS decided not to use Professor Weaver's highly relevant article as the basis for a
recommendation.
3 The ABA's Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, which has had
a "close and mutually supportive relationship with ACUS," expects that ACUS will be
reestablished. See 21ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, supra n.1 at n.2. ACUS evolved as the
executive branch's "permanent agency for the study and improvement of the efficiency and
fairness of the federal administrative process." Id For a detailed description of ACUS and its
political origin, see article by ACUS general counsel, Gary J. Edles, In Defense Of A Micro
Agency: A Look At The Administrative Conference Of the United States, THE PUBLIC LAWYER,
Winter 1995.
